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Abstract: This article posits that privacy issues arising in the United States from the use of social 
media and the employment relationship are similar to those that have arisen around the world. It sug-
gests, however, that the patchwork of governing legal claims arising under different laws in different 
jurisdictions may be unique. After a brief introduction, the second section describes the recent passage 
of legislation in several states that may protect the privacy of job applicants’ passwords to social-media 
sites. The third section describes the various claims employees may bring under the federal Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, in tort for invasion of privacy, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, or to 
enforce just cause provisions in collective bargaining agreements. The fourth section describes protec-
tion from overbroad discovery of social media when employers and former employees are involved in 
litigation. The article concludes by assessing the likelihood of further legal reform.
Keywords: social media, social networking, privacy, employment, electronic communications, 
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1. Introduction
Electronic communications by employees and employer monitoring of those communications 
raise issues for both employers and employees. The problems created by social media as it relates to 
the employment relationship are a subset of these issues. Moreover, the issues facing employers and 
employees as a result of advancing technology are similar in the United States and around the globe. 
Boundaries between home and office have become blurred. Employees often socialize, including with 
those outside the workplace, perform personal tasks at work, and work during their off hours, includ-
ing while at home. Employers express concern that employees are not working enough, or, worse, are 
engaging in inappropriate or unlawful behavior while they are on the clock. They worry that workers, 
even while at home, may be sharing confidential information or disparaging the employer in a public 
forum. On the other hand, employees are concerned that employers may abuse their technological ability 
to monitor the activities of their workers. 
What may be unique about the experience in the United States is that, unlike some other countries, 
the United States has no comprehensive regulations governing the employment relationship. Laws differ 
depending upon, among other things, the type of claim involved, the state in which the work takes place, 
whether the work is performed for the government or a private employer, and whether the workforce is 
*The author thanks Lauren Claycomb and Sharon Wright for research assistance, and Philip Heleringer, as well as two 
anonymous external reviewers, for editorial assistance. All views are solely those of the author, as are all errors.
15
16
AriAnA r. Levinson sociAL mediA, privAcy, And the empLoyment reLAtionship: the AmericAn experience
Spanish Labour Law and Employment Relations Journal (November 2013), Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 15-31
EISSN 2255-2081 - http://www.uc3m.es/sllerj
unionized. Likewise, there exists no truly comprehensive scheme that regulates electronic communica-
tion or the protection of personal data. 
Because so much depends upon the nature of the claim, the jurisdiction, and the particular cir-
cumstances, no generalized rules apply to every case. However, some predictive considerations emerge 
from a review of the cases decided to date. Protection is unlikely when the communication is with the 
public, or a large group of people. Protection is more likely when the communication is with a limited 
set of people and even more likely when with just one individual. Regardless of the number of people 
involved, however, social-media privacy protection is more likely when the social-media account is 
password protected. Privacy in social media is less likely to be protected when the media is used at 
work, and even less likely when on employer equipment. In particular, if the employer has notified the 
employee that it will monitor the social-media use, privacy is unlikely to be protected at all.
This article explores the various laws that come into play to protect employee privacy when an 
employee communicates via social media and an employer seeks to monitor or discover that activity. 
The article focuses on protection of privacy rather than the host of other related issues raised by the use 
of social media and the employment relationship. Among these other issues are the extent of the right to 
use social media to engage in advocating for a change in working conditions (RobeRt SpRague, 2012), 
the applicability of anti-discrimination laws in hiring screens (NicolaS p. teRRy, 2012) and in online 
worlds, the right to free speech online (MaRy-RoSe papaNdRea, 2012), the ways in which employers 
who are harmed by employee use of social media can be compensated, and, generally, whether and how 
employment rules apply to those working via avatar on social media sites such as Second Life (alek 
FelStiNeR, 2012). 
The article focuses on three broad topics regarding social media and privacy in the employment 
relationship. First is the issue of whether a potential employer can access a job applicant’s social-media 
profile for use in making a hiring decision. Second is the issue of whether an employer can monitor a 
current employee’s social media use, whether at work or not. Third is the issue of whether an employer 
can access a prior employee’s social-media account, a question that generally arises within the context 
of a lawsuit.
2. Hiring
Social media provides an easy and inexpensive way for employers to gather information about 
job applicants to see if they will fit well in the workplace or do a good job. Employers also sometimes 
use social media to gather information about current employees, including those who are on disability 
leave, those who have filed workers’ compensation claims, or those who have simply reported late to 
work. Employer monitoring of social-media use is nothing new (NicolaS p. teRRy, 2012). However, a 
series of recent, highly publicized cases involving employer requests for social-media passwords led a 
number of states to enact legislation regulating the practice. In Maryland, the state Department of Public 
Safety and Correctional Services asked job applicants and employees returning from leave to provide 
their social-media passwords. The American Civil Liberties Union objected, and pressured the employer 
to cease asking potential hires and returning employees for passwords.
Maryland, Illinois, and California became the first three states to pass legislation prohibiting 
employer requests for social-media passwords. Nine states have since passed similar legislation, and 
legislation is currently pending in seventeen other states.1 Two bills have been introduced at the federal 
1 On December 28, 2012, Michigan became the fourth state to pass such legislation. 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 478, H.B. 5523 
substitute, available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/publicact/pdf/2012-PA-0478.pdf; Cyberlaw—So-
cialmedia: Michigan Employers May Not Ask for Passwords, 81 U.S.L.W. 981, 2013 WL 68443 (Jan. 8, 2013). In 2013, Ar-
kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington passed statutes. As of July 2013, legislation 
remains pending in Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. National Conference of State Leg-
islatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013, NcSl.oRg, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/
telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx (last updated July 31, 2013). 
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level during the current congressional term, although they are not likely to pass.2 In the United States, a 
social-media site might also bring a breach-of-contract claim against a user—including an employer—
who uses the site in an unauthorized manner. For instance, Facebook reacted to employer requests for 
applicants’ passwords by clarifying that Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities prohibits 
soliciting a Facebook password. Facebook released a privacy statement emphasizing that it would take 
appropriate action against employers who violate the Statement, including shutting down the employ-
er’s Facebook account or initiating legal action.3 
Other federal acts do not bear directly on privacy, but warrant brief mention. Federal anti-discrim-
ination laws provide some measure of protection for at-will employees by prohibiting discrimination 
on bases including race, sex, disability, and age. To avoid liability, an employer who uses Facebook to 
screen potential hires, whether looking at public or private information, should have someone other 
than the person making the hiring decision conduct the initial screen and delete any data pertaining to 
protected characteristics.
The following sub-sections focus on the first three state laws that were passed in order to assess 
the extent to which different state laws protect the privacy of applicant and employee passwords. The 
review of the statutes discloses that the details of the text matter. Pertinent issues include the following: 
1) Will these laws be equally effective in protecting applicants and employees from viewing of social 
media sites by employers? 2) Will some be more likely to reinforce an employer’s ability to monitor 
because of the inclusion of broad exceptions? 3) Are the statutes equally effective in providing an en-
forcement mechanism or is a method of enforcement lacking? 4) Are remedies provided, and, if so, are 
they sufficient?
 a. Viewing Social Media
The state laws differ as to whether they only prohibit acquiring the means to access a social media 
site, such as a password, or also prohibit viewing of a social media site. The Maryland statute defines 
“electronic communications device” broadly,4 and the operative section states that “an employer may 
not request or require that an employee or applicant disclose any user name, password, or other means 
for accessing a personal account or service through an electronic communications device.”5 Thus, the 
blog of a well-known, management-side employment firm noted that, subject, of course, to judicial 
interpretation, the law may not prohibit an employer from asking to view or obtain a print copy of an 
employee’s social-media profile, as long as the employer does not ask for the employee’s password or 
other protected means for accessing a protected account (philip l. goRdoN, 2012).6 
2 Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://op.bna.com/tpif.nsf/id/mlon-
94nrgd/$File/Social%20Networking%20Online%20Protection%20Act.pdf; Password Protection Act, H.R. 2077, 113th Cong. 
(2013), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2077. 
3 Protecting Your Passwords and Your Privacy, Facebook (Mar. 32, 2012, 5:32 AM),
www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=326598317390057.
4 Md. code aNN., Labor and Employment § 3-712 (West 2012) (effective Oct. 1, 2012). 
(a)(3)(i) “Electronic communications device” means any device that uses electronic signals to create, transmit, and receive 
information.
(a)(3)(ii) “Electronic communications device” includes computers, telephones, personal digital assistants, and other similar 
devices.
5 Id. 
(b)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, an employer may not request or require that an employee or applicant 
disclose any user name, password, or other means for accessing a personal account or service through an electronic communi-
cations device.
6 As Philip L. Gordon states: 
Passwords To Devices: While the Maryland law bars employers from requesting log-in credentials for “accessing a per-
sonal account or service,” the law does not prohibit employers from requesting or requiring log-in credentials to access an em-
ployee’s personal device, such as a smartphone or tablet. This distinction is critical as employers increasingly are implementing 
“Bring-Your-Own-Device” policies.
...
Because the Act’s restrictions on its face arguably apply only to the disclosure of log-in credentials, it remains to be seen 
through judicial interpretation whether the Act’s restrictions bar an employer from, for example, asking an employee or applicant 
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In contrast, the prohibition contained in the Illinois statute broadly bars viewing of social media 
sites by employers. The Illinois law was an amendment to a statute already in effect that prohibits em-
ployers from asking applicants about workers’ compensation or safety claims. The law is more targeted 
toward social media than the Maryland law. Rather than using a broad definition of “electronic commu-
nication device” like the Maryland statute, the Illinois statute pertains only to an “employee’s account 
or profile on a social networking website.”7 The Illinois law, in contrast to that of Maryland, however, 
clearly prohibits an employer obtaining access in any manner to an applicant or employee’s social net-
working website. It prohibits an employer from demanding “access in any manner,” so requesting to 
view the account or a paper printout clearly fall within the prohibition.8 
California’s law focuses on protecting employees’ and applicants’ use of social media but broadly 
encompasses the use of an electronic service or account, similar to the Maryland law.9 The law prohibits 
an employer from requiring or requesting: 1) a user name or password “for the purpose of accessing per-
sonal social media”; 2) an applicant or employee to “access personal social media in the presence of the 
employer”; and 3) divulgence of “any personal social media.”10 Thus, like the Illinois law, and unlike the 
Maryland law, the California law clearly prohibits an employer from obtaining access to an applicant’s 
or employee’s personal social media site by any method, including viewing or printing its content.
b. Breadth of Exceptions 
The statutes include a variety of exceptions for employer monitoring of social-media accounts. 
All the exceptions remain subject to court interpretation, but some statutes, such as the Illinois statute, 
appear to exempt more monitoring by employers than others, such as the Maryland statute. 
In the Maryland statute, an exception is provided to permit an employer to require disclosure of 
means for accessing non-personal accounts “that provide access to the employer’s internal computer or 
information systems.”11 Additionally, the statute provides that it does not permit employees to “down-
load unauthorized employer proprietary information.”12 It further provides that the statute does not pre-
vent an employer from:
to log into a personal account without disclosing the log-in credentials to the employer so the employer can observe the content 
of the personal account or asking an employee or applicant to print the content of a personal account. Before an employer chooses 
this route, they should speak with their employment counsel to educate themselves about the legal risks of doing so. While 
Maryland is the first jurisdiction to enact this legislation, it is not likely to be the last. Indeed, bills proposing similar restrictions 
currently are pending in various states, including but not limited to California, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and Washington. In 
addition, U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D–CT) has stated his plan to introduce similar legislation “in the very near future.”
7 820 ill. coMp. Stat. aNN. 55 / 10 (West 2013), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=2398& 
ChapterID=68.
8 The Illinois statute may be amended to adopt the more narrow terminology used in the Maryland bill. See H.B. 1047, 98th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1047&GAID=12&
DocTypeID=HB&LegId=71494&SessionID=85&GA=98. 
9 cal. laboR code § 980 (West 2012). 
(a) As used in this chapter, “social media” means an electronic service or account, or electronic content, including, but not 
limited to, videos, still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or accounts, 
or Internet Web site profiles or locations.
10 Id.
(b) An employer shall not require or request an employee or applicant for employment to do any of the following:
(1) Disclose a username or password for the purpose of accessing personal social media.
(2) Access personal social media in the presence of the employer.
(3) Divulge any personal social media, except as provided in subdivision (c). (d) Nothing in this section precludes an em-
ployer from requiring or requesting an employee to disclose a username, password, or other method for the purpose of access-
ing an employer-issued electronic device.
11 Md. code aNN., Labor and Employment § 3-712 (West 2012) (effective Oct. 1, 2012). 
(b)(2) An employer may require an employee to disclose any user name, password, or other means for accessing nonper-
sonal accounts or services that provide access to the employer’s internal computer or information systems.
12 Id. 
(d) An employee may not download unauthorized employer proprietary information or financial data to an employee’s 
personal Web site, an Internet Web site, a Web-based account, or a similar account.
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(1)   based on the receipt of information about the use of a personal Web site, Internet Web site, 
Web-based account, or similar account by an employee for business purposes, from conduct-
ing an investigation for the purpose of ensuring compliance with applicable securities or 
financial law, or regulatory requirements; or
(2)   based on the receipt of information about the unauthorized downloading of an employer’s 
proprietary information or financial data to a personal Web site, Internet Web site, Web-based 
account, or similar account by an employee, from investigating an employee’s actions...
 A close reading of the statute reveals language that will be subject to interpretation. What does 
“based on the receipt of information” mean? Does permitting investigation allow an employer to view 
personal account information? Because the act has been in effect for only a short time, the answers re-
main to be seen. 
The Illinois statute, while containing a broader prohibition on viewing social media, also includes 
broad exceptions stating:
(2)  Nothing in this subsection shall limit an employer’s right to:
(A)   promulgate and maintain lawful workplace policies governing the use of the employer’s 
electronic equipment, including policies regarding Internet use, social networking site use, 
and electronic mail use; and
(B)   monitor usage of the employer’s electronic equipment and the employer’s electronic mail 
without requesting or requiring any employee or prospective employee to provide any pass-
word or other related account information in order to gain access to the employee’s or pro-
spective employee’s account or profile on a social networking website.
Unfortunately, this last provision is very unclear—may an employer use a keylogger to monitor 
what an employee does on the employee’s social networking site while on the employer’s electronic 
equipment?13 While the intent may be more limited, the law arguably permits intentional unauthor-
ized monitoring of electronic communications that is potentially challengeable under the federal Stored 
Communications Act and raises the issue of a potential conflict with that act. 
Like the Maryland law, the California law includes an exception for investigations. Unlike Mary-
land’s law, however, California’s exception clearly permits an employer to require an employee to di-
vulge content of a personal social media site during the investigation. The exception reads:
(C)  Nothing in this section shall affect an employer’s existing rights and obligations to request an 
employee to divulge personal social media reasonably believed to be relevant to an investi-
gation of allegations of employee misconduct or employee violation of applicable laws and 
regulations, provided that the social media is used solely for purposes of that investigation or 
a related proceeding.
Because the exception relies on pre-existing employer rights, the law is unclear as to what type of 
evidence of misconduct might be required before the employer could use the exception to require access 
to an employee’s personal social-media site.
c. Effectiveness of Enforcement Mechanisms
No matter how comprehensive a prohibition, a statute is only effective if it contains a mechanism 
of enforcement. Moreover, in the employment context, if a statute contains no anti-retaliation provision, 
13 A keylogger is available as hardware or software and monitors each keystroke that an employee makes. Keyloggers are 
sometimes used by employers to monitor their employees. Other software, such as SpectorSoft, that monitors everything a 
particular employee does on a computer is also available.
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then its effectiveness will often be minimized because of the ability of an employer to discharge, or 
otherwise discipline, a complaining employee. 
A close reading of the Maryland statute leaves the reader with one key question: how is the statute 
enforced? The Maryland statute contains no enforcement mechanism, likely rendering it primarily inef-
fective, unless amended to include one (philip l. goRdoN, 2012).14
The Maryland statute does include an anti-retaliation provision that prohibits an employer from 
refusing to hire, discharging, disciplining, or otherwise penalizing an employee who refused to disclose 
protected information.15 While if it had been combined with an effective enforcement provision, the 
anti-retaliation provision would offer employees significant protection, questions would still remain. For 
instance, how can an applicant or employee prove that the reason she was denied employment or fired 
was a refusal to provide a password or other protected means for accessing a personal account? 
In contrast to the Maryland statute, as part of a pre-existing statute, the Illinois law provides for 
enforcement by the Illinois Department of Labor and by civil action (lyNNe beRNabei & alaN R. kabat, 
2012). Unlike the Maryland statute, however, the Illinois law contains no robust anti-retaliation provi-
sion prohibiting refusal to hire, discharge, or other discipline. A provision elsewhere in the act makes 
it a petty offense to retaliate against someone who complains or sues—for which a $1,000 fine is the 
maximum punishment.16
Similar to the Maryland statute, the California law is completely silent as to what enforcement 
mechanism, if any, is available. The California statute states that the Labor Commissioner “is not re-
quired to investigate or determine any violation of this act.”17 Some point to a potential, albeit untested, 
enforcement mechanism by civil suit under California’s Private Attorneys General Act. Under that law, 
an employee could allege violations in a civil action. This remains to be tested in an actual suit (giNa 
haggeRty liNdell & l. geoFFRey lee, 2012).18
14 As Philip L. Gordon states: 
Notably, the Maryland law contains no enforcement provision. The law does not authorize applicants or employees to sue. 
The law does not even delegate authority to the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, or any other govern-
ment agency, to enforce it. It is possible that an employee terminated in violation of the law might have a claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy. However, because that claim typically applies only to discharge, it is unclear whether 
an employee who is disciplined short of discharge would have a claim. It also is uncertain whether an applicant who is denied 
employment in violation of the law would be able to assert a claim.
15 Md. code aNN., Labor and Employment § 3-712 (West 2012) (effective Oct. 1, 2012). 
(c) An employer may not:
(1) discharge, discipline, or otherwise penalize or threaten to discharge, discipline, or otherwise penalize an employee for 
an employee’s refusal to disclose any information specified in subsection (b)(1) of this section; or
(2) fail or refuse to hire any applicant as a result of the applicant’s refusal to disclose any information specified in subsec-
tion (b)(1) of this section.
16 730 ill. coMp. Stat. aNN. 5/5-4.5-75 (West 2012).
17 The Act states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Labor Commissioner, who is Chief of the Division of 
Labor Standards Enforcement, is not required to investigate or determine any violation of this act.”
18 According to the authors:
The Legislature did not provide for any specific penalties for violating this new law. As such, existing law under the Labor 
Code Private Attorneys General Act would likely allow an aggrieved employee to file a civil lawsuit, to receive a specific pen-
alty amount, and to obtain an attorney’s fee award. 
Interestingly, the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement has disclaimed any desire or responsibility to investigate or 
enforce any alleged violations of this new law.
See cal. laboR code § 2698 (West 2012). The Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 provides:
(f) For all provisions of this code except those for which a civil penalty is specifically provided, there is established a civil 
penalty for a violation of these provisions, as follows: 
(1) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person does not employ one or more employees, the civil penalty is five 
hundred dollars ($500).
(2) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person employs one or more employees, the civil penalty is one hundred 
dollars ($100) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred dollars ($200) for each 
aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation.
(g) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an aggrieved employee may recover the civil penalty described in subdivision 
(f) in a civil action pursuant to the procedures specified in Section 2699.3 filed on behalf of himself or herself and other cur-
rent or former employees against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed. Any employee who prevails in 
any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Nothing in this part shall operate to limit an 
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Also like the Maryland law, the California law includes an anti-retaliation provision prohibiting 
discharge, discipline, or other retaliatory action against an employee or applicant for refusing to comply 
with an employer’s request for protected social-media information. The California law, even more explic-
itly than the Maryland law, by including a statement specifying that the law does not prohibit an employer 
from taking adverse action if otherwise permitted by law, raises the unresolved issue of what method will 
determine whether discipline or a refusal to hire resulted from the prohibited conduct or for some lawful 
reason.19
d. Remedies
Even with an enforcement mechanism, a law will generally be used only if it provides an adequate 
remedy. The Maryland statute does not specify remedies for violating the prohibition on requesting a 
password or other means of accessing a social-media account. Additionally, the remedy available to an 
applicant or employee who suffers adverse consequences for refusing to disclose her password is not 
specified. Again, court interpretation will be necessary to determine the applicable remedies.
In contrast, the Illinois statute specifies the available damages. Damages available in a civil action 
are actual damages, and, where the violation is willful and knowing, attorney’s fees and costs. The avail-
ability of attorney’s fees often makes pursuit of claims easier for plaintiff employees.
If an applicant or employee in California can bring a civil action under California’s Private Attor-
neys General Act, then a court would assess penalties based upon the number of aggrieved employees. A 
prevailing plaintiff could also receive attorney’s fees. (giNa haggeRty liNdell & l. geoFFRey lee, 2012). 
Employer requests for applicant passwords provided the impetus for the states to pass privacy 
protective statutes, of which those first passed by Maryland, Illinois, and California are exemplary. But 
the statutes in the states that have passed such legislation also regulate the same behavior with regard to 
employees.20 What, if any, other mechanisms regulate privacy and employee use of social media during 
the employment relationship in these states? What about states that have not passed—and may never 
pass—such regulations? These laws are the topic of the next section.
3. During the Employment Relationship
Because there exists such a patchwork of potentially applicable laws, claims in the United States 
arise under various state and federal statutes, common law, and pursuant to collective bargaining agree-
ments. This section begins with a discussion of cases arising under the federal Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act (ECPA), particularly under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and follows with 
employee’s right to pursue or recover other remedies available under state or federal law, either separately or concurrently with 
an action taken under this part.
Id. See also 2012 California Labor and Employment Legislative Update, JoNeS day (Oct. 2012), http://m.jonesday.
com/2012_california_labor/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
The new law contains no enforcement provision. Potentially, an employee terminated for refusing to provide access to a 
social media username or password could bring a claim for wrongful termination. Additionally, it is possible that a violation of 
the new statute could result in a claim for penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), 
Cal. Labor Code section 2698 et seq.
Id.
19 cal. laboR code § 980 (West 2012). 
(e) An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten to discharge or discipline, or otherwise retaliate against an em-
ployee or applicant for not complying with a request or demand by the employer that violates this section. However, this sec-
tion does not prohibit an employer from terminating or otherwise taking an adverse action against an employee or applicant if 
otherwise permitted by law.
Id. Often in the United States under discrimination statutes, courts will use what is termed a burden shifting paradigm where 
the employee must ultimately prove that the adverse action resulted from the protected conduct. Courts have borrowed this 
framework, which is rather confusing, for use in other employment contexts.
20 The New Mexico statute may govern only applicants. S.B. 371, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013), available at http://www.
nmlegis.gov/Sessions/13%20Regular/bills/senate/SB0371.pdf. 
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a review of state cases arising under state common law for invasion of privacy. It then turns to potential 
protections for public employees under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and finally, 
discusses some cases decided in labor arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
a. ECPA
A few notable cases have arisen under the ECPA, particularly under Title II of the Act, the 
SCA. There is a strong argument that this statute should be interpreted to provide a high level of pro-
tection for employee privacy. Indeed, some courts have interpreted the statute to protect employees’ 
password-protected social-media sites. The ECPA provides minimum statutory damages for each vio-
lation, including violations of the SCA, which provides for a minimum fine of $1,000 or, if greater, 
actual damages.21
The ECPA is a complex and outdated statute that was passed in the 1980s,22 and its details are 
beyond the scope of this article. What is important to a discussion of social media and the employment 
relationship is that Title II, the SCA, prohibits intentional, unauthorized access to stored electronic com-
munications. Several courts have held that an employee who provides a password to personal email or 
other online accounts in response to pressure from an employer has not truly given consent. Thus, the 
employer’s access is not authorized.23 A couple of courts have applied the same principle to password 
protected social-media sites. A related federal statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, similarly 
protects stored communications. No employee claims have been filed under that statute, however, pre-
sumably due to difficulties in proving the high level of required damages. 
In 2009, two employees sued in a New Jersey federal district court after they were terminated for 
posts made in a MySpace chat group. The jury found the employer had unlawfully accessed the com-
munications without user authorization. The court upheld the jury verdict. The employees had used their 
MySpace accounts and passwords to participate in an invitation-only chat group. A manager accessed 
the group after pressuring another employee to disclose her password. The court upheld an award of 
compensatory damages resulting from loss of work, as well as an award for punitive damages.24 The 
result is especially interesting in an at-will employment context. Employment at will means an employer 
may normally terminate an employee for any reason or no reason at all, with some statutory and com-
mon law exceptions. Yet, in this case, a statute not particular to the employment relationship resulted in 
compensation for lost work.
Another case was decided in the Northern District of Illinois in 2011. In this case, an employee 
stored passwords to both her personal and work-related Facebook and Twitter accounts in a locked 
folder on the employer’s server. While the employee was off work recovering from injuries sustained in 
a work-related accident, the employer accessed and used her personal accounts to promote its interior-
design business. The court declined to grant summary judgment to the employer, finding that “there is 
undisputed evidence in the record that Defendants accessed [plaintiff’s] personal Facebook account 
and accepted friend requests... [and] that Defendants posted seventeen Tweets to [plaintiff’s] personal 
Twitter account... As such, there are disputed issues of material fact whether Defendants exceeded their 
authority in obtaining access to [plaintiff’s] personal Twitter and Facebook accounts.”25
21 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (West 2012).
22 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (West 2012).
23 Brahmana v. Lembo, No. C-09-00106 RMW, 2009 WL 1424438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2009) (denying motion to 
dismiss ECPA claims for unlawfully intercepting and using employee’s personal password); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior 
Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (an employee should have the opportunity to refuse or withdraw 
consent to monitoring); Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (reasoning that 
unauthorized access includes reading an employee’s emails on a password protected web-based account, hotmail); Stengart v. 
Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010) (holding attorney-client privilege protects emails sent on company 
issued laptop through personal, password-protected, web-based email account).
24 Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (jury could infer 
employee was pressured into providing a password and as such did not authorize employer’s use of online chat group). The 
employer was a restaurant. Id.
25 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 WL 6101949 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011).
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While the aforementioned cases involved current employees, there is an argument that pressuring 
an applicant into providing a password for a social-media account would also result in unauthorized ac-
cess. No case has yet tested this theory. 
b. State Law and Invasion of Privacy Tort
As discussed in Section 2, many states have recently passed legislation protecting both applicants 
and employees from employer efforts to obtain social-media passwords. Most states also have enacted 
equivalents of the ECPA, including the SCA. Delaware and Connecticut require employers to notify em-
ployees that their electronic communications are being monitored. The requirement presumably extends 
to the monitoring of social-media activity.26 Two other states, Michigan and Illinois, prohibit employers 
from gathering information on personal communications for inclusion in personnel records. This pro-
hibition would, presumably, extend to gathering information about communications via social media.27 
Three states—New York, Colorado, and North Dakota—expressly protect lawful, off-duty conduct. In 
New York, protection extends only to recreational activity, a category that excludes dating, but presum-
ably includes online activities such as blogging, chatting, or posting on Facebook.28 
In states that have not enacted such legislation, the most likely claim would involve a common-
law tort claim for invasion of privacy, often termed intrusion on seclusion.29
In the Illinois case involving the hospitalized interior designer, discussed in sub-section 3.a, in 
addition to the SCA claim, the plaintiff also brought an invasion-of-privacy claim. In Illinois, as in many 
other states, the claim requires a showing of: 1) unauthorized intrusion, that would be 2) highly offensive 
to a reasonable person, involving a 3) private matter, which, in many states, means a matter in which the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and 4) anguish and suffering. Because the plaintiff had 
1,250 Twitter followers and numerous Facebook friends, and because she was promoting the employer 
design firm and linking to its page on her personal accounts, the court held that she had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her social-media accounts. The plaintiff did not try to keep the information 
private, and the information was not, in fact, private.30
As a federal district court in New Jersey has noted, courts normally find no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in social-media accounts without privacy settings limiting access to a few people. Accounts 
open to public view will not be considered private. On the other end of the spectrum, communications 
made to only one person will be considered private. In the middle, where the account is not public but is 
open to more than one person, however, different courts may rule differently. On the facts presented, the 
court denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy. The plaintiff was a nurse, as 
well as president of her union local. (Often, it is a union representative who brings a claim. This is not only 
because employers may retaliate against union activity, but also because the union is funding the litigation, 
while other non-union represented employees may not be able to afford filing suit.) Another nurse, who 
was Facebook “friends” with the plaintiff, accessed her friend’s account and allowed the employer to view 
26 Connecticut requires notice of any monitoring that is not direct observation. See coNN. geN. Stat. aNN. § 31-48d (West 
2012). Delaware covers monitoring of telephone, internet, and email. del. code aNN. tit. 19, § 705 (West 2012). 
27 820 ill. coMp. Stat. aNN. 40 / 9 (West 2012); Mich. coMp. lawS aNN. § 423.508 (West 2012).
28 colo. Rev. Stat. aNN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2012) (just termination); N.y. lab. law § 201-d (McKinney 2012) (any 
type of adverse action); N.d. ceNt. code § 14-02.4-03 (West 2011) (any type of adverse action or lawful off-duty conduct). 
29 There have been several successful claims. See, e.g., Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. 
Wis. 2002) (Hotmail might be entitled to reasonable expectation of privacy and may have been highly offensive for employer to 
go onto employee’s personal account and read his emails); Restuccia v. Burk, No. CA 952125, 1996 WL 1329386 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 13, 1996) (finding that there could be a reasonable expectation of privacy in a business email where the employee 
was told he could use email account for personal communications and he had his own password, but without his knowledge, 
employer had a separate password; court denied summary judgment). There have also been unsuccessful claims. See, e.g., 
Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746 (D. Or. 2004) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when 
employee downloads inappropriate content from personal email at work and stores it in folder marked personal at work, if 
employee did not restrict with password, and not highly offensive for employer to monitor by investigating Internet hits, but 
not content); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding no expectation of privacy when employee com-
municate with supervisor over company email, even if employee was assured his email would not be intercepted by manager). 
30 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 WL 6101949 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011).
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her posts. In one post, the plaintiff had criticized paramedics for saving the life of an octogenarian who had 
open fired at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. The hospital reported the post to various regula-
tory boards. The court reasoned that the plaintiff “may have had a reasonable expectation that her Face-
book post would remain private, considering that she actively took steps to protect her Facebook page from 
public viewing.” The court noted that reasonableness and offensiveness are fact-specific inquiries, and that 
it was not evident how many Facebook “friends” the plaintiff had, or how many people could have viewed 
her post.31 Notably, the employer did not move to dismiss the ECPA claim, probably because the employee 
allegedly had been coerced, and there was thus no user consent to access the stored communications.
c. Public Employees 
The U.S. Constitution protects individuals, including government employees, from certain gov-
ernment actions. The Fourth Amendment in particular protects against unlawful searches and seizures. 
This protection has long been interpreted to apply to employees’ privacy in items such as their private 
offices, desks, and locked cabinets.32 
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a Fourth Amendment case involving an employer that 
searched an employee’s text messages sent on an employer-issued device.33 The case received a great 
deal of publicity, and brought the issues of employer monitoring and employee privacy to prominence. 
The Court ruled that, even if there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages sent on the 
employer-issued device, the search was for a reasonable purpose and was carried out by reasonable means. 
The Court declined to decide whether the employee, a SWAT Team officer, had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his messages, which pertained to a tryst involving his wife and another officer, reasoning that 
rapid advances in technology warranted reserving the expectation of privacy issue for a later case. The 
Court did, however, imply in a separate analysis about the reasonableness of the intrusion that the plain-
tiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. As to the reasonableness of the employer’s actions, 
the Court reasoned that the employer had a legitimate interest in determining the cause of excessive text 
messages for which the employer was being billed. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that reviewing the 
transcripts was an expedient and efficient way of meeting that objective. The Court further reasoned that 
the two-month scope of the review was also reasonable, especially in light of the employer’s policy, which 
notified employees that text messages were subject to audit. Another interesting aspect of this case is that 
while the plaintiff lost the Fourth Amendment claim at the Supreme Court level, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the third-party service provider had violated the SCA when it released the text messages to the employer 
without the employee’s consent. That aspect of the case stands as governing law, at least for now.
One article recently offered predictions for how courts are likely to treat social-media privacy un-
der the Fourth Amendment (alexaNdeR Naito, 2012). The article asserts that Fourth Amendment doc-
trine, which treats the disclosure of a communication to a third party as fatal to any reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, leaves most social-media communications unprotected. At the same time, the article 
acknowledges that messages sent to one individual, via Facebook, for example, will likely be protected 
unless the recipient discloses them to an employer.34 A more optimistic scenario for privacy advocates 
than that proposed in the article is that courts will adopt an approach that falls somewhere between the 
two extremes, finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications shared with a limited 
readership. This seems particularly likely where the communication is password protected or accessible 
by invitation only. Social-media communications shared with large numbers of people seem less likely 
to be protected because they are so easily shared and more easily accessed by an employer. The article 
expresses concern that the current focus on accessibility to physical workspace means an employee has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in online communications, as long as the employer is physically 
31 Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp., No. 2:11-cv-03305 (WJM), 2012 WL 1949668 (D.N.J. 2012).
32 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
33 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2012).
34 Cf. Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (discussing in discovery context how no reason-
able expectation of privacy inheres in social media because a communication is not private once having reached a recipient and 
because terms of service do not guarantee privacy).
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able to access its own equipment. Courts may, however, be more willing to easily analogize between 
physical space and virtual space. If a virtual space offers as much privacy as, say, a private office or desk, 
it also offers a reasonable expectation of privacy. The article also expresses concern that courts focus too 
much on whether an employer has notified workers of an intent to monitor, and not enough on whether 
an individual employee has taken reasonable steps—such as setting a password—to protect her privacy. 
While it is true that courts tend to focus on notice, it seems possible that policies in which employers 
reserve the right to monitor online activity will not vitiate the reasonable expectation of privacy in com-
munications protected with personal passwords. Of course, if the employer is monitoring and obtaining 
personal communications without need for the password, and the employee is aware of the monitoring, 
then a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be found to exist.  
A related non-privacy issue is whether First Amendment rights are violated when public employ-
ees are disciplined for opinions conveyed through social media. The United States generally provides 
strong protection for free speech, but that protection is curtailed in the employment context. An em-
ployee acting in an official capacity has no protection. If the employee is acting in an unofficial capacity, 
protection is afforded only where the statement is of public interest, and the need to make it outweighs 
the employer’s interest in running an effective workplace. Many high-profile cases involve teachers who 
have been terminated for comments posted via social media. One author recently wrote an interesting 
piece suggesting that free-speech precedent should be overturned and interpreted to provide more pro-
tection for teachers posting via social media (MaRy-RoSe papaNdRea, 2012). 
d. Arbitration 
In the United States, unionization is generally at the plant or store level. Unions often negotiate 
for contract provisions that say an employee can be terminated only for just cause, which provides some 
privacy protections for the use of social media, particularly during off-duty hours. Arbitration decisions 
provide particular insight into the issue, since arbitrators are more likely than courts to delve into the 
details of a specific employee’s situation. Arbitrators consider factors including the employee’s mental 
health, length of employment, and interaction with other employees.
Generally, arbitrators will uphold employer rules prohibiting personal use of employer equipment 
for electronic communications when the policy is enforced and progressive disciplinary steps are fol-
lowed. Most will permit personal use to be limited to an employee’s break time. But as to an employee’s 
off-duty life, arbitrators will generally find it beyond an employer’s control unless a direct nexus to the 
employment justifies disciplinary measures (aRiaNa R. leviNSoN, 2010). 
Many arbitration decisions are unpublished, but a few published decisions address employee use 
of social media. One especially relevant case involved an employee’s use of social media with his fam-
ily outside work.35 The employee was in the process of a divorce and worked at the same plant as his 
father-in-law. He sent his mother-in-law a profane Facebook message, saying that the mother-in-law 
would be judged by God and live in hell. The employee then sent a second message saying he would see 
the father-in-law at the plant. The employee had been incarcerated for 100 days on domestic-violence 
charges stemming from an incident involving his wife. The day after the employee returned to work, the 
father-in-law told the human resources department about the messages. As it happened, the employee 
had sent a third message, the day after sending the first two, apologizing for his previous statements and 
expressing an intention to turn his life around. He suffered from depression, anxiety, and insomnia, and 
was in therapy for eight months. The arbitrator decided that the first message had not been a threat. The 
second, while threatening, was not equivalent to an express threat of physical violence made during a 
confrontation at the plant. The arbitrator found the third message to have been a sincere apology. The 
in-laws had not been particularly troubled, had delayed informing the company, and contacted a pros-
ecutor only at the company’s suggestion. The arbitrator found that the off-duty conduct had not been 
sufficiently threatening to justify discharge, and imposed a 30-day suspension instead. The arbitrator 
further ordered that the employee be made whole for any additional losses.
35 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Steelworkers, 130 Lab. Arb. Rep (BNA) 461 (2011) (Bethel, Arb.).
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Another case not only involved privacy for off-work conduct, but also raised a hot topic in United 
States labor law—protected concerted activity. In this case, the arbitrator found just cause to terminate 
an employee for posts made in a closed Facebook group.36 The four group members were co-workers 
but one shared a Facebook account with her husband. The husband relayed the communication, which 
eventually found its way to the employer. The grievant had made 10 of the 16 posts in the group, and 
had approved of a “racist” entry pertaining to a white manager. The arbitrator found that the conduct 
was not protected concerted activity, and that there was a sufficient nexus to work to justify discharge. 
As to the privacy issue, the arbitrator recognized that another arbitrator reinstated another em-
ployee who had made only four posts.37 But the grievant approved of two posts that constituted threats, 
and made numerous disparaging comments. The arbitrator thus found a sufficient nexus between the 
posts and employment to justify discharge. The case illustrated the ways in which boundaries between 
on- and off-duty conduct can become blurred. The grievant made all the posts from home or from her 
personal smart phone. While she asserted the posts from her phone were made during break, the arbitra-
tor insinuated they were made during time she should have been working. In any event, the arbitrator 
reasoned that the posts undermined the working relationship with administration, co-workers, and par-
ents. Thus, there was a sufficient nexus between the conduct and her employment. 
As to the argument that the posts were protected concerted activity, the arbitrator reasoned first 
that the majority of the posts were not about terms and conditions of work at all. The arbitrator found 
only one comment was about work, and that post was about a supervisor arriving late and expecting the 
chat group members to be timely. The arbitrator reasoned the post was admittedly just griping and was 
not meant to induce action for mutual aid or protection. He held the employees were not acting together 
to address workplace concerns. 
When employees are using social media in the way they would previously have conversed 
around the water cooler to discuss terms and conditions of employment, the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) forbids the employer from taking negative action. This approach constitutes a straightfor-
ward application of the law governing protected concerted activity. Nevertheless, the National Labor 
Relations Board’s (NLRB) rulings have generated a lot of attention from the press because employ-
ers are wary that Facebook is a more public and more easily accessible forum than the water cooler. 
Moreover, the law often renders unlawful employer rules and policies that are overbroad in prohibiting 
the use of social media and that would deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity 
for fear of violating the rule (RobeRt SpRague, 2012). Generally, these claims would be brought to the 
NLRB, rather than an arbitrator, which would assess whether the conduct was concerted, either done 
as a group or as an outgrowth or impetus toward group activity; for mutual aid and protection, meaning 
conversation more than mere griping regarding terms or conditions of employment; and not so profane 
or disloyal as to lose the protection of the Act. Professor Bob Sprague recently reviewed approximately 
100 charges filed with the NLRB, related to social-media use, and the thirty-six documents generated 
by the NLRB in these cases: twenty-one NLRB Office of the General Counsel Advice Memoranda, ten 
General Counsel reviews, four Administrative Law Judge decisions, and one Board decision. A related 
privacy issue that Professor Sprague recognizes the NLRB will likely have to address is that employ-
ers are prohibited by the NLRA from conducting surveillance of union activity.38 Thus, an employer 
who tracks online organizing arguably has violated the NLRA. Since the Sprague review, the Board 
has issued another decision regarding the use of social media for protected concerted activity, which 
confirms that the standard analysis of protected concerted activity applies when employees are using 
social media.39  
36 Vista Nuevas Head Start (AFSCME MI local), 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1519 (2011) (VanDagens, Arb.).
37 Id. That arbitrator found the posts were private, the husband had breached their privacy, and the employer was responsible 
for sharing the posts with co-workers and parents. The arbitrator in the summarized case does not directly address that argument 
for breach of privacy, other than to mention that the employer did not seek out the posts but was justified in acting once it found 
out about them. The arbitrator instead reasoned that because the plaintiff invited co-workers to post, and the posts would disrupt 
the environment of teamwork and acceptance of all people and cultures, discharge was warranted.  
38 Id. at 1009.
39 Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 37 (2012).
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Turning back to the arbitration cases, another privacy-related issue arises when someone other 
than the employee posts information that reflects negatively on the employee. In one case, a high school 
teacher’s estranged wife posted nude photos of the teacher on MySpace. The decision does not indicate 
whether access was restricted, but it does not appear to have been because children were able to access 
the photos. The arbitrator upheld the termination because the teacher had not taken reasonable steps to 
maintain custody and control of obscene photos.40  
4. After the Employment Relationship
Discovery during litigation generally raises issues as to whether social-media communications 
are discoverable and, if so, to what extent. Many cases arise where an employer seeks to access a prior 
employee’s social-media account. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery of any non-
privileged information reasonably calculated to lead to relevant information.41 This is a very low bar, 
considering that the Federal Rules of Evidence define “relevance” as any information that makes a 
fact in controversy more or less likely.42 But the rules further provide that a discovery request must be 
made with reasonable particularity,43 and must not be unduly burdensome.44 The rule regarding requests 
for electronically stored information contains a similar requirement restricting unduly burdensome dis-
covery.45 Thus, some courts have disallowed wholesale discovery of social-media communications on 
these grounds. Whether generalized, applicable principles will develop via judicial precedent, and, if so, 
whether they will be codified, remains to be seen. 
One case recently in the news presents the issue well. Home Depot is a large company and em-
ployer. It does some innovative things to foster good employment practices, such as anonymous hiring 
and promotion. Nevertheless, an employee sued the company, claiming she was terminated as a result of 
40 Warren City Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 532 (2007) (Skulina, Arb.).
41 Fed. R. civ. p. 26(b). Discovery scope and limits:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain 
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including the existence, descrip-
tion, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons 
who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
Id.
42 Fed. R. evid. 401. Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
Id.
43 See Fed. R. civ. p. 34. Rule 34(a) permits discovery of information in party’s custody, control, or possession, but must 
describe with reasonable particularity—show reasonable notice of what called for and what not. Id. Rule 34(b) provides:
(1) Contents of the Request. The request:
(A) must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected . . . .
Id.
44 FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) provides that [o]n motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it 
determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;...
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues.
45 Rule 26(b)(2)(B) addresses “Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information.” Fed. R. civ. p. 26. According 
to Rule 26(b)(2)(B):
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reason-
ably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom 
discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that show-
ing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering 
the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
Id.
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her gender and a disability and that the company had failed to accommodate her disability, a condition 
known as vertigo (declaN Mccullagh, 2012).46
 The employer sought to discover four categories of social media:
(1)   Any profiles, postings or messages (including status updates, wall comments, causes joined, 
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) from social networking sites from October 2005 
(the approximate date Plaintiff claims she first was discriminated against by Home Depot), 
through the present, that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state of 
Plaintiff, as well as communications by or from Plaintiff that reveal, refer, or relate to events 
that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state;
(2)   Third-party communications to Plaintiff that place her own communications in context;
(3)   All social networking communications between Plaintiff and any current or former Home 
Depot employees, or which in any way refer [or] pertain to her employment at Home Depot 
or this lawsuit; or
(4)   Any pictures of Plaintiff taken during the relevant time period and posted on Plaintiff’s profile 
or tagged or otherwise linked to her profile.
The court notes that, generally, discovery requests must be reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence, and must describe the information requested with reasonable particu-
larity. The court also noted that many cases involving social media require a threshold showing that the 
information sought is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The court reasoned that the simple fact that the plaintiff had communicated was not relevant to 
her mental health—it was the content of the communications that mattered. The court found that the first 
and second requests had failed to meet the requirement for reasonable particularity because “any emo-
tion” could cover anything from momentary frustration over the late arrival of a cable repairman to an 
emotional reaction to a movie or TV show. The court further reasoned that a request for photos covering 
a seven-year period was too broad. However, the court held that the request for communications with 
Home Depot employees was adequate to put plaintiff on notice as to what was requested, and ordered 
her to provide that information.
Another issue that sometimes arises is whether information stored in social media can be subpoe-
naed from a non-party service provider. One high-profile, non-employment case held that it cannot, be-
cause the SCA bars third-party providers from releasing information without the user’s consent, and the 
SCA makes no exception for discovery (RobeRt l. aRRiNgtoN, aaRoN duFFy & elizabeth Rita, 2012).47 
Commentators generally agree that the court correctly interpreted the SCA, and at least one other court 
has ruled accordingly (bRuce e. boydeN, 2012). Yet, at least one state court in a non-employment case 
has ordered that a plaintiff authorize the third-party service provider to grant the defendant access.48 And 
courts deciding employment cases may follow suit.
For instance, the magistrate judge in one employment case stated that, if necessary, he would 
order that the plaintiff authorize the service provider to produce records the plaintiff herself could not 
46 Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 11-03892 DOC (SSx), 2012 WL 3939063 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012). 
47 The authors note that the SCA prohibits subpoenaing third parties who host social networking cites, but that courts use 
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require plaintiffs to produce the social networking pages and archives of de-
leted information for inspection. Id. at 22–24 (citing Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010)). 
See also SteveN S. geNSleR, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 aRk. l. Rev. 7, 26–27 (2012).
48 Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). The case was a personal injury case where publicly 
available social media indicated the plaintiff was not being honest about the extent of injuries. See id. In two other personal 
injury cases where publicly available social media indicated the plaintiff was not being honest about the extent of injuries, the 
court ordered the plaintiff to turn over user name and password to counsel. See Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 
5632688 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 8, 2011); McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010). In one, Largent, the plaintiff attacked the request as overbroad, burdensome, and embarrassing, 
and the court limited access to thirty-five days. Largent, 2011 WL 5632688. The governing rules in these state cases may differ 
slightly from the federal rules of procedure. 
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produce.49 The plaintiff, a white, Jewish female, filed a retaliation and discrimination suit against her 
employer. The employer served a subpoena upon LivePerson, a “‘web site that is a platform for online 
advice and professional consulting services,’” including sessions with online psychics. The employer 
sought to obtain the plaintiff’s communications with LivePerson psychics, including excerpts of chat 
sessions she had forwarded to her work email account. In her communications with LivePerson, the 
plaintiff had discussed her “work performance, relationships with co-workers, views regarding her treat-
ment by [defendant], emotional state before, during, and after her employment, efforts to mitigate dam-
ages, and personal beliefs about African-Americans.” LivePerson moved to quash the subpoena, arguing 
that the plaintiff could readily access and produce the requested materials. The plaintiff, however, had 
deleted many of the chat remarks and, thus, claimed she could not produce them in discovery. 
The court did not resolve the issue of whether the SCA prohibited LivePerson from producing the 
information. The court reasoned that there were questions as to whether the information was electroni-
cally stored and as to whether the plaintiff consented to disclosure via the site’s initial terms of use. The 
court held that the plaintiff should create a new LivePerson account and request that LivePerson restore 
her deleted chats so that plaintiff could turn over copies of the chats to the defendant. Significantly, the 
magistrate also stated that it might order the plaintiff to authorize the release by LivePerson of any mate-
rial she could not restore. 
Professor Steven Gensler recently published an article arguing that no additional or specially tai-
lored rules are necessary for the discovery of social media because existing rules adequately address the 
situation (SteveN S. geNSleR, 2012). The article argues that a party would have to prove the relevance 
of the entire account to properly obtain an entire Facebook account. The article acknowledges that two 
courts, in three cases, have erroneously ordered access to an entire social-media site,50 but believes that 
will not develop as the governing rule. The article also argues that courts err in requiring a showing of 
publicly available social-media information before permitting discovery of relevant private information. 
The article expects courts to use protective orders, such as in-camera filings, to protect privacy.
Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggest that even private social-media activity should 
be discoverable, as long as it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence and 
is unprotected by attorney-client or other privilege. There is an argument, of course, that the rules that 
governed in a time of letters are inadequate for an era in which great quantities of private information 
are potentially accessible. As a practical matter, the sheer volume of information may make discovery 
difficult, though the rules already contain exemptions for requests that are unduly burdensome. Perhaps 
for these reasons, a new privilege should be developed to protect social-media activity in the absence of 
a higher threshold than one “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.”
Alternatively, it might be argued that social-media information should remain private due to the 
unique nature of the employment relationship. Perhaps permitting discovery of social media in the em-
ployment context deters lawsuits and encourages discrimination and other bad conduct. However, such 
a result seems unlikely. To the extent that courts err by granting defendants access to entire social-media 
accounts, further rulemaking might be appropriate. Rules prohibiting access to entire social-media ac-
counts would be particularly appropriate if courts were requiring particularized requests in certain types 
of cases, such as commercial suits, but not in others, such as employment suits.  
5. Conclusion
Privacy protections for social-media use in the United States depend not only on whether one 
is an applicant, employee, or former employee, but also on a host of other considerations. Some 
predictive considerations do appear, however, from a review of the cases. Privacy in social media 
is unlikely when the communication is with the public, or a large group of people. Privacy in social 
49 Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 4374, 2012 WL 1197167 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
50 See also bRuce e. boydeN, Oversharing: Facebook Discovery and the Unbearable Sameness of Internet Law, 65 aRk. l. 
Rev. 39, 50 (2012) (noting these erroneous published case are just the “tip of an unseen iceberg of unreported cases”).
AriAnA r. Levinson sociAL mediA, privAcy, And the empLoyment reLAtionship: the AmericAn experience
30Spanish Labour Law and Employment Relations Journal (November 2013), Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 15-31
EISSN 2255-2081 - http://www.uc3m.es/sllerj
media is more likely when the communication is with a limited set of people, and even more so when 
the communication is with an individual. Regardless of the audience, privacy is more likely to be pro-
tected when the social-media account is password protected. Privacy for social-media activity is less 
likely in the workplace than at home, and even less likely when employer equipment is used. Privacy 
protection is especially unlikely where the employer has notified the employee of its intent to monitor 
social-media use.
The most likely trajectory of reform involves the passage of more state laws similar to those in 
Maryland, Illinois, and California. If these future laws contain adequate provisions for enforcement, 
adequate remedies, and effective anti-retaliation provisions, they will arguably provide the highest level 
of protection for job applicants and employees of the available potential claims. Without those important 
provisions, the prevailing patchwork will remain. For those involved in post-employment litigation, rule 
reform does not appear likely. However, case law may develop rules that protect litigants from overly 
broad or unduly burdensome requests. 
Arguably, the most sensible type of reform would be a comprehensive federal employment statute 
governing technology and privacy in the employment relationship (aRiaNa R. leviNSoN, 2010). A compre-
hensive federal law could alleviate some of the uncertainty for employers and employees that results from 
the current patchwork of laws. Additionally, a law that addresses social media as well as other technological 
advances eliminates concerns about ill-thought out differences in treatment of equally invasive technologies. 
Some academics have, of course, suggested other innovative alternate approaches targeted at 
social-media use. For instance, one recent article in the American Business Law Journal proposes that, 
because social media makes it difficult to segregate audiences, U.S. law should incorporate principles 
of situational privacy (patRicia SáNchez abRil, avNeR leviN, & aliSSa del Reigo, 2012). The authors 
propose creation of a right to designate as private certain areas within the workplace by tagging a photo 
“confidential” or by marking a folder “private.” They also propose a right to delete information, and a 
rule prohibiting reliance on personal or off-duty conduct as a basis for adverse action. Three states have 
already enacted legislation protecting the privacy of lawful, off-duty conduct. The other proposals are 
unlikely to become law, at least in the near future. 
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